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ABSTRACT 
This article introduces the first findings of the Political Party Database (PPDB) project, a major 
survey of party organizations in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies. The project’s 
first round of data covers 122 parties in 19 countries. In this paper we describe the scope of the 
database, then investigate what it tells us about contemporary party organization in these 
countries, focussing on parties’ resources, structures and internal decision-making. We examine 
party-family and within country organizational patterns, and where possible we make temporal 
comparisons with older datasets. Our analyses suggest a remarkable coexistence of uniformity 
and diversity. In terms of the major organizational resources on which parties can draw, such as 
members, staff and finance, the new evidence largely confirms the continuation of trends 
identified in previous research: ie, declining membership, but enhanced financial resources and 
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more paid staff. We also find remarkable uniformity regarding the core architecture of party 
organizations. At the same time, however, we find substantial variation between countries and 
party families in terms of their internal processes, with particular regard to how internally 
democratic they are, and in the forms that this democratization takes. 
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Introduction 
How do parties organize, and how much do parties’ organizational differences matter? The aim 
of the Political Party Database Project (PPDB) is to provide systematic answers to the first 
question so that we can better answer the second one, the crucial “so what?” question about party 
organizational variations.  Other questions we seek to answer are to what extent, and why, do 
parties retain certain structural features despite changes in their competitive environments?  For 
instance, are some traditional organizational features of parties in parliamentary democracies 
outmoded, such as party conferences and party membership, merely quaint relics and nostalgic 
remnants? To use Bagehot’s terminology (1963/1867), have parties’ extra-parliamentary 
organizations become the “dignified” elements of party constitutions, with the real work of party 
politics being done by the “efficient” parts of the organization, be these the professionalized 
party staffs or the party officeholders?  Bagehot wrote that the dignified elements were theatrical 
and often old elements which helped “to excite and preserve the reverence of the population” 
(61); similarly, some party practices might be remnants of earlier conditions which nevertheless 
contribute to the legitimacy of party government.   
Generating legitimacy is not a small thing, as Bagehot himself noted, but is this all that 
parties voluntary organizations contribute to contemporary politics?  Or do parties retain these 
institutions because they continue to contribute in other ways?  We do not expect to find simple 
or universal answers to any of these questions, but we do expect to gain traction in answering 
them by using systematic data to test posited relationships.  This conviction has inspired the 
establishment of the PPDB.  In the remainder of this article we introduce this database, and 
present some of our initial findings regarding the state of contemporary party organizations in 19 
democracies. 
 
I. The Long Tradition of Comparative Party Scholarship: Concepts, Categories and Data   
The comparative study of political parties’ extra-legislative organizations and activities is more 
than 150 years old, having arisen alongside the emergence of electoral politics. In the middle 
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third of the 20th century, the comparative study of political parties was stimulated and re-defined 
by authors who ambitiously constructed new categories and new causal theories to explain 
organizational differences between political parties in multiple democracies, and to explain 
changes over time (including Neumann 1954; Duverger 1954; Heidenheimer 1963; Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967; Kirchheimer 1966; Epstein 1968; Sartori 1976). More recent contributors have 
continued to develop this approach (cf. Ware 1987; von Beyme 1988; Panebianco 1988; 
Schlesinger 1994). A common feature of these multi-country studies is their reliance on thick 
description to buttress their arguments. Some of their most enduring contributions are now-
familiar labels (e.g., mass, catch-all, electoral professional, etc.)  Much of the theoretical 
speculation in these classic studies treats parties and party organizations as dependent variables, 
explaining how contemporary parties bear the marks of their origins, and how organizational 
differences reflect institutional contexts and ideological (party family) similarities.  
Echoing more general trends in political science, recent decades have witnessed the rise 
of more systematic and more quantitative studies of political parties’ organizations and activities 
outside the legislative arena.  Much of this research relies on party statutes and documents for 
evidence about party structures, sometimes combined with expert judgments about how parties 
actually work.  One notable investigation that combined both approaches was Kenneth Janda’s 
pioneering study of party organization and practices in 53 countries (1980). Janda and his 
colleague Robert Harmel later proposed a different framework for collecting and interpreting 
data about party organizational change, one aimed more squarely at understanding practices in 
democratic regimes (1994). The 1980s also brought the start of another ambitious effort to gather 
cross-party and longitudinal data on party organizational development, what became the 12-
country Party Organizations: a Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western 
Democracies, 1960-90 (Katz and Mair 1992). This effort focused on what the editors dubbed the 
“official story” approach, primarily reporting published data and formal rules. Data collected in 
this Handbook have been used for a variety of studies, including ones that update parts of its data 
(for instance Caul 1999; Poguntke 2000; Bille 2001). 
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II.  Introducing the PPDB2 
The PPDB project falls squarely within this tradition of evidence-driven approaches to the 
comparative study of political parties. It deliberately builds on and extends past efforts, while 
aiming to complement, not duplicate, other contemporary efforts to gather data on elections and 
representation. Thus, in some cases it replicates questions that have been used in earlier studies, 
making it easier to use some of PPDB’s snapshot data for longitudinal comparisons. Our dataset 
also includes match keys to facilitate integration with several other major data sources. 
In forming what was essentially a data-gathering collaborative endeavour, members of 
this project agreed to pool their efforts and standardize variables in order to maximize the utility 
of our individual data gathering efforts. In building our initial team, we deliberately sought out 
members with varied theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of political parties. 
This diversity is reflected in the data that we chose to gather. (A full list of those involved in this 
data collection effort is included in Appendix 2.)    
We decided early on to focus on the “official story”, in order to facilitate future 
replication; this decision also constrained our choice of variables.3 We also prioritized gathering 
data that would be useful for studying parties and their resources as independent variables – in 
other words, that would help us answer the questions of why and how organizational variations 
matter.   
Another priority from the outset has been to facilitate the more general study of political 
parties. To this end our team has worked to make the data available to others as quickly as 
possible, with the aim of stimulating research in this field. We particularly hope that it will be of 
interest to researchers who might otherwise have ignored party agency and party organizational 
capacity because of the difficulty of finding good cross-national party data. 
The PPDB Round 1 data provides information on 122 parties in 19 countries during the 
2010-2014 period. The four modules of the database include over 300 variables that collectively 
describe some of the most important aspects of party structures and practices. For some parties 
and some variables we have readings for more than one year; for most, however, we have just 
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one data point for each party and variable. We have deliberately included most countries 
included in the Katz/Mair Data Handbook to maximize the value of the data. Overall, we have 
selected (mostly) parliamentary regimes which differ in many theoretically relevant ways. For 
instance, they have different electoral systems, different electoral thresholds, use both federal 
and unitary structures, have varied lengths of democratic experience, varied population sizes, and 
disparate levels of state funding for political parties. In short, this data set offers multiple 
opportunities to test questions about how institutional settings can affect the ways that parties 
organize, and about when and how this matters. Taken as a whole, this collection provides an 
extraordinarily detailed current snapshot of extra-parliamentary parties in both established and 
newer democracies.   
The conceptual roadmap that guided our choice of indicators was the view that party 
organizations can usefully be described in terms of their structures, their resources, and their 
linkages. We further subdivided each of these dimensions with the aim of answering specific 
questions. For instance, a recurring question for scholars is the extent to which parties should be 
viewed as unitary actors. In order to better answer this question, we incorporated indicators 
derived from four structural sub-dimensions which illuminate the formal location of decision-
making within the party, and at what level (if at all) these decisions are enforced (leadership 
autonomy, centralization, coordination, and territorial dispersion). Similarly, we sub-divided the 
resource dimension into three categories of resources (money, members and staff) in order to 
better identify dependency relationships and resource control (for more details see Scarrow and 
Webb forthcoming). We assume that these three aspects of party organizational development are 
related, and indeed, that some measures may have multiple meanings. This conceptual 
foundation helped to ensure that we have gathered sufficient data to test the predictions of the 
many theories of party organizational change, including those which posit links between parties’ 
internal power dynamics and their resource bases. In a nutshell, we have collected data on, 
among others, party membership, party staff, party finance, basic party units, party executive 
composition, formal links to collateral organizations, women’s representation, leadership 
selection, candidate selection, manifesto construction and approval, and intra-party referendums  
(for a detailed documentation of our data see insert webpage address here). 
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III. Extra-Parliamentary Parties in Contemporary Democracies: Structural Similarities, 
Resource Differences? 
In other publications the many authors of this paper will use PPDB data to study the impact and 
origins of party organizational differences (see, for instance, the chapters in Organizing 
Representation, forthcoming). Our aim in the current paper is more straightforwardly 
descriptive: we want to highlight some important similarities between - and key differences 
across - party organizations in established party democracies.  In what follows we present a few 
of the key findings from the PPDB, pointing out important patterns of practice in terms of 
resources, structures, and linkages.  
 In the sections below, we describe organizational differences across countries, and 
across party families. Previous studies give us mixed messages about what patterns we should 
expect to find. We know that parties are moulded by their social and institutional environments 
as well as by their ideological heritage (Harmel 2002, Harmel and Janda 1994), but when 
looking at parties from various parliamentary systems we are uncertain about whether 
ideological leanings (party family) will outweigh the effects of country-specific institutions. 
Major contributions towards the literature on party types have drawn attention to organizational 
contagion across geographic and ideological boundaries, identifying a developmental trajectory 
leading from cadre to mass to catch-all to cartel parties as the dominant pattern (Neumann 1956, 
Duverger 1951; Kirchheimer 1966; Epstein 1968; Katz and Mair 1995). These approaches tend 
to downplay the impact of country-specific institutional and social factors. If they are right, we 
should expect our cross-sectional data set to show a large degree of similarity in the way parties 
organize, while ideological or national factors should not be very important. With our 
comprehensive cross-national data, we are now in a position to test how well the idea of a modal 
party type holds empirically.  
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IV. Resources: Money, Staff, Members 
We begin our assessment of contemporary party organizations by examining three types of 
resource conventionally associated with organizational strength: money, staff and members. All 
are potentially important resources that can help parties to win elections.4  
 
A. Money 
Money is the first – and perhaps most important - resource on which parties rely. In this section 
we review what the PPDB tells us about the incomes of national parties’ head offices. To 
facilitate comparison, Table 1 reports national patterns in four ways: average party income, 
average party income relative to the size of national economy, average income relative to the size 
of the electorate, and the financial dependence of parties on the state (i.e.  percentage of income 
from public subsidies). The first of these indicators tells us which countries have the richest and 
poorest parties in absolute terms; inevitably, however, these things can be expected to reflect to a 
considerable extent the relative size and wealth of each country, and indeed, the generosity of the 
state, which is why it is also interesting to examine the other indicators. For parties for which we 
have more than one year’s worth of data (which is most of the dataset), we use the mean score of 
all available measures; for others we are only able to draw on a single year of data. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In terms of absolute levels of income, it is plain from the first column in Table 1 that the 
German, French and Spanish parties are much wealthier than those of any other country on 
average, while the Italians also receive well above the overall average of 14.2 million euros per 
year. In saying this, we should take note of the fact that we only have data for the two largest 
parties in France, which probably inflates the country’s position relative to others in this table.5 
The Israeli, Hungarian, Irish and Danish parties feature among the poorest in these terms. When 
we control for the size of the national economy, we see that a rather different pattern emerges, in 
that the Czech, Spanish, Portuguese and Austrian parties enjoy most income relative to GDP, 
while the British and Dutch are poorest. However, if we additionally correct for the number of 
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registered electors – the size of the body politic, as it were – we find that the Poles, British and 
Hungarians are the most impecunious, with their parties only attracting 17, 28, and 29 cents per 
registered elector, respectively (see Table 1, column 3). At the other end of the scale, the 
Norwegians and Austrians stand out as being in a league of their own, with the former country's 
parties earning 2.77 euros and the latter’s slightly under 2 euros per elector. Germany, which is 
at the top of the table for the first measure, is only in the middle of the pack when income is 
standardized by the size of the national economy or the number of voters. While countries vary 
widely in the per-voter sums available to their parties, we might reasonably reflect that even two 
or three euros per elector is not such a high price to pay for one’s democracy: arguably, the 
world’s parliamentary democracies get their party politics on the cheap. Finally, the fourth 
column in Table 1 reveals the extraordinary extent to which the parties in contemporary 
democracies have become financially dependent on the state. In 11 of the 18 countries for which 
we have data, the mean dependency ratio is over 50 percent, and in five countries (Hungary, 
Israel, Belgium, Austria and Portugal) it is in the range of three-quarters or more. At the other 
end of the scale, the UK is a stark outlier, with its parties only deriving an average of 9 percent of 
their income from the state.  
 
What of the different party families? Table 2 reveals a straightforward and not 
particularly surprising story when the data are broken down this way.6  The wealthiest parties are 
the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats.  These well-established party families have 
dominated much of Europe’s post-war history as governing parties. All other party families have 
lower, but relatively similar, average income levels. The ‘big two’ are well above the overall 
mean income of 15 million euros per year, while all others are considerably below it. This 
pattern remains broadly true, no matter how you look at it – in raw currency values, relative to 
national income, or per elector. The Social Democrats do best in each of these regards, while the 
Green parties fare poorest. There is relatively little variation around the mean in terms of 
dependence on state funding, except that the small number of far right parties seem especially 
well served by state support. Analysis of variance suggests that differences between countries 
explain more of the variance in party income than differences between party families, in so far as 
eta-squared is always higher for the inter-country variations in Table 1 than for the inter-family 
variations in Table 2. This is, of course, only preliminary evidence: multivariate modelling 
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would be required to draw more definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, it points to the likelihood 
that patterns of party funding converge around national models more than they do around typical 
party family models. Furthermore, the fact that both inter-country and inter-party family 
differences are statistically significant across all of these indicators undermines the notion that 
there is any generally ‘typical’ model of party organisation.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
B. Staff 
One of the most under-researched fields in the study of political parties is that of party 
employees. This is a significant oversight, which leaves us with a deficient understanding of an 
important aspect of party organizational development. This is particularly so since it seems likely 
that payroll staff are more important than ever before. In part this is because modern election 
campaigning and political marketing depend on professional expertise. In addition (and 
relatedly), it is likely that parties have come to rely increasingly on paid professionals in the 
context of party membership decline and ‘de-energization’ around the democratic world (Seyd 
and Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley et al, 1994; see also below).  
What evidence does our database provide about current levels of party staff? In 
investigating this issue, we are reminded of one of the main reasons for the relative lack of 
research into party employees: the sheer difficulty of getting the relevant data. For whatever 
reason, many parties tend to be reluctant to provide data on the number of payroll employees that 
they have. The PPDB also suffers from the same reluctance. That said, we believe that we have 
sufficient information to generate a meaningful picture. We have central party staffing data for 
15 countries, and legislative party staffing data for 12 countries, giving us a total of 60-63 parties 
for the various staffing measures we report here.7 A further complication is that snapshot 
comparisons of party payroll figures could be misleading if the data come from different points 
in the electoral cycle, because many parties hire more staff in election than non-election years. 
As it happens, most of the PPDB staffing data comes from non-election years, with the exception 
being the parties in Denmark, Ireland (for Fine Gael and Fianna Fail) and Portugal. This means 
that the particular snapshot we have can be regarded as largely representative of parties' 'normal' 
mode of operation in non-election years.  
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
What do we find, then? Table 3 shows that the Spanish and British parties have the most head 
office staff, whether measured in absolute or relative terms. (This also appears true of Germany, 
but we have head office staffing data for only one German party, so cannot be sure if this is 
representative). We should perhaps be wary of taking some of the very low national averages too 
literally, because they are either based on very few cases (eg, Portugal, Hungary, Israel) or key 
data are missing for large parties (eg, the Danish Social Democrats). Table 3’s figures on 
legislative party staff are distorted by an obvious outlier – Germany, whose parties appear to 
employ quite extraordinarily high numbers of parliamentary staff. These party staff are in fact 
formally employees of the state; however, they have a number of functions, some of which are 
party-related, so we think that it is justified to regard them as a party resource.8 Excluding the 
German parties, the average number of legislative party employees is just 26.2, which is perhaps 
a more generally representative figure of the database countries as a whole. Comparing the 
figures in the first and third columns of Table 3, we see that parties in countries such as Hungary, 
Portugal, Israel and Ireland apparently place their human resources more in Parliament than in 
the national headquarters, while parties in other countries (including Spain, Britain and the 
Czech Republic) tend to opt for the opposite approach. Of course, the number of staff that parties 
employ to assist their MPs might reasonably be expected to reflect the number of legislators that 
they return to Parliament, so it is also useful to control for the size of parliamentary parties in 
assessing staffing establishments. Hence, Table 3 also reports the mean number of legislative 
employees per MP that parties maintain in each country. Overall, this produces a rather modest 
figure: the German parties are, of course, substantially higher than any others, being able to call 
on the support of nearly 7 staff members for each MP, but in most other the countries the norm is 
only about 1 or 2. By a similar logic, when evaluating the number of central party staff as a 
resource it is interesting to control for the numbers of party members whom they might need to 
serve. This shows relatively little variation across country, there being only slightly more than 1 
employee for every hundred members across the dataset as a whole; the Danish, Hungarian and 
Israeli parties would appear to enjoy the highest central staff/member ratios, but the latter two in 
particular are based on very few cases, so should be regarded with great caution. 
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What of patterns by party family? The figures Table 4 report these, but deliberately 
exclude German parties, which are such outliers on legislative party staffing that they tend to 
distort general patterns that would otherwise be apparent. We see a pattern that is broadly 
familiar from the analysis of financial data in so far as the major parties of the Christian 
Democratic/Conservative and Social Democratic families predominate in terms of absolute 
staffing establishments, both inside and outside parliament. That said, the Greens and Left 
Socialists employ high quantities of staff relative to their individual memberships and numbers 
of MPs. Again, we should note that the eta-squared coefficients generally suggest stronger 
country effects than party family effects in respect of party staffing. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
C. Parties and members 
The literature on party members has grown considerably over the past two decades, seemingly in 
inverse relationship to the numbers of the subject under investigation (including Heidar 1994; 
Katz, Mair et al 1992; Mair and Van Biezen 2001; Scarrow 1996; Scarrow 2000; Seyd and 
Whiteley 1992; Van Haute 2011; Van Haute and Carty 2012; Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 
2012; Weldon 2006; Whiteley 2011; Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson 1994; Widfeldt 1999, to 
mention only a few). The evidence on the decline of party membership numbers across the 
democratic world is overwhelming. In Table 5, we update the story of individual party 
membership trends by reporting a number of things: the aggregate membership across all parties 
for each country is noted, along with the size of the registered national electorate at the nearest 
national election, and the consequent membership/electorate ratio.  
The downward trend which has so often been observed remains apparent in our data. The 
mean aggregate membership figure for the 15 countries for which we have longitudinal data 
since the 1980s was 886,850 per country at the start of the time-series; by the mid-to-late 2000s 
when van Biezen et al (2012) reported their figures the average had fallen to 633,425 for the 
same countries; and in the PPDB data for the years 2011-2014, it has dropped to 549,360. 
Indeed, if we include the three further countries that are part of the PPDB but were not in the van 
Biezen et al study (Australia, Canada and Israel), the national average falls to just 501,337. Not 
surprisingly, the picture is similar even after controlling for the size of electorates; the average 
membership/electorate ratio (ME) for the original 15 countries was 7.50 in the early 1980s (or 
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1990 in the case of Hungary), but had declined to 4.14 by the mid-2000s. The PPDB shows that 
it now stands at 3.53 (or 3.45 if you include Australia, Canada and Israel). The only country in 
which the ME ratio has not declined in recent years is Ireland, which appears to have 
experienced a modest increase from 2.03 to 2.15 in the 5 years following 2008. 
 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 
What is the picture if we break down the analysis by party family? Table 6 sheds some light on 
this question. The pattern revealed is familiar: as usual, the Social Democrats and Christian 
Democrats have the largest average memberships of any party family, and the highest average 
ME ratios. Some of the smaller parties (far right and Left Socialists) have surprisingly high ME 
ratios where they are successful, but this is only in a limited number of countries. In summary, 
then, the Christian Democrats, Socialists and Conservatives continue to have the highest ratios of 
members to electors in their countries. Once again, the eta squared statistics in Tables 5 and 6 
suggest greater variation by country than by party family. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
To summarise: in examining the organizational resources at the disposal of the 122 parties in our 
database, we have found that ME ratios continue to fall in almost all the PPDB countries, such 
that little more than 3 percent voters now join political parties in these disparate countries; that 
German, Spanish and French parties seem to be the richest in terms of funding and staff; and that 
party staffing levels are relatively modest in most countries, although extraordinarily high in 
Germany. While the data seem to confirm the perception that overall party membership and 
party staffing levels are moving in different directions, we need more robust longitudinal 
analyses to confirm this. Moreover, even if there is some effect of parties substituting 
professional staff for member volunteers, the net effect has been small, with most parties having 
remarkably lean staffing in their national headquarters.    
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For many parties the focus of their paid human resources is the national party head office, 
although for some it is more likely to be the party in parliament. However, it has also become 
apparent that if there are any general trends, they have certainly not wiped out considerable 
differences that remain between countries and ideological families. It seems likely to us that 
those differences are usually better explained by country rather than party family. 
 
V. Structures:  Surprising Uniformity?  
Extra-parliamentary organizations first developed in late 19th and early 20th centuries, stimulated 
by the organizational efforts of opposition parties, including Socialists and workers in Germany, 
Austria and the UK, Liberals in the UK, farmers’ parties in Scandinavia, and religious parties in 
Belgium and the Netherlands.  These parties had widely differing aims, but many of them 
adopted very similar organizational structures: they operated as clubs with statutes, membership 
procedures and annual dues, local branches, annual or biennial national congresses as the 
nominally highest party organ, and smaller executive committees holding broad authority 
between meetings of the national conference. This “subscriber democracy” model was 
particularly well-suited to parties which began as extra-parliamentary organizations, or which 
had small legislative delegations; in such parties there was  less chance for conflict between a 
party’s legislative delegation and the party congress (Morris 2000; Scarrow 2015: ch. 2.).  
By the middle of the twentieth century, parties in most parliamentary democracies had 
adopted some variant of the subscriber democracy model of party organization. Of course, 
similarity in structures can accommodate multiple practices, and in political parties (as in many 
other organizations) informal channels can be at least as important as the formal decision-making 
process. Nevertheless, the adoption and spread of the individual member/congress model may be 
politically consequential. Its use signals acceptance of the norm of parties as micro-polities: 
parties and their leaders gain legitimacy from their relationships with a self-defined polis. This 
relationship is said to complement and strengthen their relationship with a wider electorate. 
Adopting this model also signals recognition of the utility of permanent organization for policy 
and mobilization, as opposed to relying exclusively on elected representatives and ad hoc 
campaign organizations.   
The extent to which extra-parliamentary organizations contribute to legitimacy, or help 
electoral mobilization, are empirical questions. In both areas we would expect that some 
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arrangements are more effective than others, and that their impact may vary by circumstances, 
and according to fashion. Indeed, parties may have different metrics for judging effectiveness, 
depending on which goals they prioritize (office, votes, or policy?), and how their priorities 
change over time. As a result, even if many parties adhere to a basically similar model, we would 
expect to find cross-party organizational variation, and experimentation within single parties 
over time. After all, we know that a string of parties have made headlines in recent years by 
claiming that they are going to do politics in a new way, and therefore will have different kinds 
of party structures and organizational practices.  (These are sometimes given poetic names, like 
the “liquid democracy” of the German Pirates Party, or the “Operating System” software of the 
Italian Five Star Movement.) If novel party organization can increase a party’s election 
prospects, we would expect organizational experimentation to flourish, as parties compete for 
marginal advantages. 
Partly confounding this prediction is one striking finding from our survey of 
contemporary party organizations in parliamentary democracies: the sheer uniformity in basic 
organizational structures and rules. Old parties and new continue to adhere to a subscriber 
democracy organizational model in which dues-paying members are the polis for most or all 
important decisions, and in which the party conference is (formally) the party’s highest organ. 
Thus, not only do all but one of the PPDB parties seek to enrol dues paying members (with the 
exception being the Dutch right-populist Freedom Party, led by Geert Wilders).  In addition, 
many parties are experimenting with new enrolment rules, and some have introduced new types 
of membership (see Pedersen, Scarrow, van Haute forthcoming).  However, for the most part 
they maintain the distinction between supporters who enrol with the party, and those that do not.   
A. Representative Assemblies 
Almost all the party statutes establish representative internal decision-making structures, 
with the party congress at the formal apex. The following section will say more about the actual 
distribution of power among party levels; for now, what we want to emphasize is that the 
member/congress template still plays a prominent role in party claims to be internally 
democratic. Most party statutes stipulate that the party congresses will meet regularly, with 75 
percent of parties requiring these assemblies to be held more than once every three years (see 
Table 7). Across party families there is a modest amount of variation in the frequency with 
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which these need to be held. Most notably, three quarters of Green Parties require their congress 
to meet at least once a year. In contrast, the “old left” Left Socialists are most likely to set loose 
requirements, with 40 percent of them stipulating that party congresses must be held at least once 
every 4 or 5 years. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Most parties have a smaller executive committee at the top of their extra-parliamentary 
organizations. Because these bodies have different names across parties, we asked our 
respondents to tell us about the highest executive body that is recognized in the party statutes. In 
other words, we are not interested in cabinet meetings or informal meetings between party 
leaders and their trusted advisors. As a rough rule of thumb, we suggest that the smaller these 
bodies are, the more likely it is that they are conducting some of the real business of leading the 
party. About half the parties have executive committees with 20 or fewer members; these are 
small enough to be effective governing bodies. When we compare this to analyses based on the 
data documented in the Katz/Mair Handbook, we see a remarkable stability in the configuration 
of the essential intra-party bodies. In other words, organizational innovation has been very 
limited over time (Poguntke 2000: ch 6). 
In the majority of parties (56 percent), these executive committees report directly to the 
party congress. Most of the remaining parties have an additional medium-sized committee 
between the party congress and the executive. The incidence of such intermediate-level 
committees is inversely related to the frequency of the required meetings of party congresses: the 
more committee layers, the greater the time span between required meetings of the party 
congress (r=.259). In terms of the relation between different “faces” of the party within the party 
organs, it is interesting to note that the party executives do not solely represent the extra-
parliamentary parties. In half the parties, at least 20 percent of the members of the party’s 
executive committee are also members of the national legislature. 
 
B. Leadership Powers 
Despite the widespread adherence to the subscriber-democracy organizational model, party 
statutes vary widely in the powers and responsibilities they grant to their party leaders. These 
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differences affect both the extent to which leaders’ roles are explicitly specified, and the 
specified relationship between the party leader and the extra-parliamentary party. For instance, as 
Table 8 reveals, a fifth of the party statutes give the party leader the right to help select his or her 
deputy, and to summon the party congress, while nearly a third give the leader the right to 
summon the party officials.9 More than 90 percent of the statutes explicitly mention that the 
party leader could or should attend the party congress or party executive. A small number (5 
percent) formally give their leaders the right to approving or veto coalition agreements; similarly,  
only 7 percent of the parties give the party leader a statutory right to appoint one or more 
members of the party executive. In addition to these rights, some party statutes explicitly address 
certainly roles that the leaders should take up. Thus, two-fifths refer to the leader’s position as 
external representative of the party; interestingly, however, just over a quarter make the leader 
formally accountable to the party congress. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
These nine items in Table 8 (setting out leaders’ autonomy and rights) can be combined to 
produce an additive index of leadership power. As Table 9 shows, parties are widely dispersed 
on this index, approximately following a normal distribution, but no party earns the top possible 
score for leadership autonomy.    
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
What, if anything, do these statutes tell us about how parties distribute decision-making 
authority between the party leader, the extra-parliamentary party, and the parliamentary party?  
Although structures seldom or never provide the complete story about who holds power and 
influence within a party, intra-party conflicts are undoubtedly shaped by the formal rules, and by 
the norms these rules embody. The correlations in Table 10 point towards an interesting and 
consistent pattern: the larger the party (whether in terms of members, seats held in the legislature 
or number of people sitting on the national executive), the greater the leader’s power. It is also 
noteworthy that the leader appears to have more rights the more frequently parties hold 
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congresses. On the face of it, this is a more counter-intuitive finding, although it might simply be 
a function of party size, in that larger parties generally hold more frequent congresses.  
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
To the extent that party statutes contain an element of rhetoric, we would expect that 
ideological (as in party family) preferences would affect the arrangements outlined by statutes, 
including the roles ascribed to leaders. Our data show traces of this (Table 11). As we would 
expect, Green and Left Socialist parties have the lowest mean scores, and the Far Right parties 
have the highest mean scores. Yet these averages also disguise some within group variation, and 
all the averages are relatively low. In other words, although party family seems to play some role 
in determining these arrangements, the impact is far from overwhelming.  
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
To conclude: the predominant finding of this section is the striking similarity in what 
might be termed the organizational skeletons of the parties. Whereas the previous section showed 
considerable cross-national variation in the distribution of resources, this section shows the 
continued dominance of the subscriber democracy model across established and newer 
democracies, and across party families. This enduring similarity is seldom remarked upon, but 
we find it notable, not least because it has survived several waves of populist challenges over the 
past four decades. Parties that proudly deviate from this basic model, and which claim to pursue 
a new brand of democracy, tend to receive a great deal of attention from the media and scholars 
alike. In fact, however, few of those parties have gained enough traction to join and stay in a 
legislature for more than one or two terms. Those that do tend to change their organizations in 
ways that make them more similar to the organizations of their older peers. Such organizational 
convergence is undoubtedly encouraged by national regulations and statutes that dictate some of 
the fundamental organizational options for parties and/or voluntary organizations.  Yet that is not 
the whole explanation, because in some cases party structures pre-date the laws, and in any case 
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parties themselves are in a position to alter the regulations if they wished to do so. If the 
organizational convergence is not driven by ideology, perhaps it has been driven by the utility of 
the model (cf. Poguntke 1998), and/or by its perceived legitimacy. 
 
 
VI. Parties as Democratic Linkage 
 
A. Measuring Intra-Party Democracy 
We have seen in the previous section that political parties largely resemble each other when it 
comes to the configuration of their core party bodies. However, when we take a closer look at 
how their organizations provide for linkage to the citizenry, we find remarkable variation which 
questions a prevailing narrative in the literature that assumes a succession of dominant party 
types.  
The membership organization of political parties is one of their principal ways of 
generating linkage to society (Poguntke 2000). While adherents of a Schumpeterian view of 
democracy would argue that democracy does not necessarily require democratic linkage through 
parties, others maintain that it is virtually unthinkable except in these terms. Obviously, we 
cannot decide this debate here. However, our data allows us to investigate the empirical realities 
irrespective of normative desirability. We have collected data on a considerable number of 
variables that are related to the democratic quality of political parties’ internal politics. While 
many of them are not very interesting individually, they can be combined in a meaningful way to 
create valid measures of intra-party democracy (IPD).10  
As defined here, the benchmark of IPD is that it should facilitate the involvement of as 
many party members as possible in the decisions that are central to a party’s political life, 
including programme writing, personnel selection and other intra-organizational decision-
making.11 From this perspective, it seems plausible to argue that the degree of organizational 
decentralization represents an independent component of IPD that should be measured 
independently of general inclusiveness, a point several of us have made elsewhere (Hazan and 
Rahat 2010; Scarrow 2005: 6; von dem Berge et al. 2013). For the sake of parsimony, in this 
examination we will focus solely on the degree of inclusiveness to measure IPD, because 
empirically these concepts overlap. For instance, a higher degree of decentralization 
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automatically leads to a higher degree of inclusiveness because more party bodies (like the 
German Land parties or the British constituency parties) play a role in certain crucial decisions, 
each of which represents a different approach to realizing inclusiveness.12  
 
B. Two Variants of Intra-Party Democracy 
Although we do not distinguish between inclusiveness and decentralization, we do make a 
different theoretically-based distinction in our measurement of IPD, constructing separate indices 
for assembly-based and plebiscitary variants of IPD.13  Each of these represents a different 
approach to discerning the will of the group. Assembly-based  IPD assigns decision-making to 
meetings, whose participants debate propositions and then take a decision. Plebiscitary IPD 
separates the stages of debate and decision-making.  Both types may be more or less inclusive.  
While assembly-based IPD is often associated with decisions made by a meeting of party 
delegates, it also includes decisions made at town-hall type assemblies in which all attendees are 
eligible to debate and vote.  We contend that plebiscitary decision-making embodies a 
fundamentally different logic as it provides no way to deliberate and reach compromise 
(frequently through repeated rounds of voting). It is the politics of ‘either/or’, which arguably 
gives a lot of power to the leaders (Katz and Mair 1995: 21). It may, however, also be used as a 
leadership-challenging device. This is an empirical question. What counts for us now is that it 
follows an inherently different logic (Cross and Katz 2013).  
Following this logic our assembly-based IPD-index (AIPD) measures the inclusiveness of 
decision-making inside parties that is based on discussions within party bodies and assemblies, 
including assemblies of all members (e.g., at the constituency level). It covers the three essential 
components of intra-party democracy, namely programme writing, personnel selection (leaders 
and candidates) and organizational structure (referring to the relative strength of party bodies like 
congress and executive). A higher index score indicates that a more inclusive party body has the 
final say in this area. 
Our plebiscitary IPD index (PIPD) measures the degree to which parties allow for non-
assembly decisions based on one member, one vote. These decisions are made by the lone party 
member at home on a computer screen, or casting a ballot in a party-run polling station. It covers 
only programme writing and personnel selection. A higher index score means that a party has 
more opportunities for ballots on these aspects. The PIPD index assigns a positive value to all 
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parties which incorporate such procedures in their rules, even if they are optional or apply only 
in certain situations or are complemented by assembly-based procedures. It is difficult to 
envisage a large party organization which is exclusively based on plebiscitary decision-making 
(even though the Italian Five Star Movement may come close), but we found a surprisingly high 
number of parties which mix these two decision styles.  Over 55 percent of the parties in our 
study provide for some plebiscitary decision-making.  
Conceptually, our AIPD index is a formative index (Diamantopoulos et al. 2008; 
Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001) consisting of three logically independent components: 
programme writing, personnel selection and organizational structure. Unfortunately, for many of 
our cases we have incomplete information about all three components. However, because testing 
shows that these components are highly correlated, we have decided to include all cases with 
valid data for at least 2 of our 3 components.14 Our calculations are based on data for the years 
2011 to 2014 using the most recent available measurement point.  
We start by asking whether our conceptual distinction between assembly-based and 
plebiscitary intra-party democracy holds empirically. First, the relatively weak correlation 
coefficient of 0.37 (Pearson) indicates that both indices are related, yet most likely measure 
separate dimensions. This supports our contention that it makes sense to look at both dimensions 
when trying to assess the extent to which parties are internally democratic, because some parties 
are inclusive with one type of procedure, but not with the other. 
 
C. Patterns of Intra-party Democracy: Divergence rather than Uniformity 
When we turn to simple descriptive statistics, we also see substantial differences between our 
two measures. Both indices have a theoretical minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1. The mid-
point of 0.5 indicates a neutral position vis-à-vis our two IPD measures: such a party is neither 
particularly inclusive nor elitist in its intra-party politics (von dem Berge/Poguntke 2016 for 
details). The results for the assembly-based IPD index show that all but one of the 122 parties 
included in our study have internal structures that satisfy a minimum level of internal democracy. 
The exception is the one-man Dutch Freedom Party of Geert Wilders which has no party 
members and hence no internal structure to speak of. It has therefore been coded missing for our 
IPD indices. 
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[Table 12 about here] 
 
Our data show that the AIPD index, which measures intra-party democracy based on meetings 
and exchange of arguments within party bodies, represents the essential core of intra-party 
democracy. We have a valid measurement for all parties, and none of the parties comes close to 
the minimum value of our index (the lowest value is .26) while some parties go all the way 
towards almost perfectly democratic internal procedures (see Table 12 and Figure 1). Whereas 
most parties cluster in the middle range of the AIPD index, the pattern changes substantially for 
the plebiscitary variant of IPD. More than 40 per cent of the parties in our study have not 
institutionalized any plebiscitary mechanisms, but some parties reach our maximum value of 1.0. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
For both indices, we find substantial variation between parties.  Do we find evidence of 
systematic patterns in the ways in which the two variants of IPD are combined in different party 
families and countries?  It is easy to imagine how such patterns might arise. For instance, highly 
inclusive plebiscitary procedures might be a substitute for less inclusive assembly-based 
procedures. Think, for example, of a populist party which uses plebiscites to legitimate the 
policies of its leadership while providing little space for genuine internal discussion. Such 
substitution strategies are not necessarily confined to populist parties. A key element of the cartel 
party argument is the suggestion that leaders of established parties may seek to enhance their 
autonomy by promoting plebiscitary modes of decision-making which by-pass middle level 
elites (Katz and Mair 1995: 21). Yet inclusive plebiscitary procedures could also be additive, if 
parties with a strong tradition of assembly-based internal democracy feel compelled to adapt to 
the pressure of a public discourse which regards plebiscitary decision-making as inherently 
superior to assembly-based modes of democracy (Fuchs 2007; Pappi 2015: 224-25; Zittel 2006). 
In the populist case, we would expect a very low AIPD score to go together with a high PIPD 
value, while in the latter (“pan-democratic”) case we would expect a positive correlation.  As 
reported above, the relatively weak correlation between our indices suggests that no single 
pattern dominates. 
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A closer look at the main party families shows clear differences between them in terms of 
IPD usage. They do not, however, always meet the obvious theoretical expectations. For 
instance, while the Greens are associated with calls for democratization of public life, overall 
they have only a mid-range score on our plebiscitary index, although they are the most 
democratic party family when comes to assembly-based intra-party politics. The Social 
Democrats, on the other hand, come closest to our pan-democratic model, with comparatively 
high scores for both types of practices (see Table 13). Christian Democrats/Conservatives 
conform to the conventional wisdom in that they register average discursive IPD scores and 
fairly low plebiscitary values.  
 
[Table 13 about here] 
 
Surprisingly, the Far Right does not score high on the plebiscitary index even though this 
category encompasses populist right-wing parties. To a degree, this may be due to the fact that 
we have lumped together two party groups which analytically belong to separate categories, 
namely extreme right and populist right-wing parties. We have chosen to do so because this 
distinction, even though theoretically meaningful, is frequently empirically fuzzy as many parties 
meander between extreme right-wing and more ‘acceptable’ right-wing populist appeals. If we 
look at the two groups separately, we can see that populists record higher PIPD values (.32 and 
.14). However, they are still not conspicuously high and we must read these results with some 
care as the number of cases is fairly low. Finally, the most notable result is that Left Socialist 
parties are by far the most reluctant party family when it comes to plebiscitary measures. It 
seems plausible to speculate that this may reflect the influence of traditional left-wing 
organizational thinking, with its considerable emphasis on party discipline.  
In sum, our data show stronger party family differences in terms of plebiscitary practices 
than assembly-based ones. Although plebisicitary politics have often been linked with political 
extremism, our evidence suggests that parties on the far left or right of the spectrum have been 
most hesitant to embrace plebiscitary measures. These variations also become apparent when we 
simply add both index values. Here we find that the Social Democrats narrowly lead because 
they have most enthusiastically embraced plebiscitary measures while the parties on the radical 
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fringes are least democratic. However, there are considerable differences regarding the balance 
between assembly-based and plebiscitary forms of IPD, which reminds us that we should not too 
readily generalize about one dominant organizational model of party organization. 
When we break down our data by country, we clearly find that nation-specific factors 
also play also an important role, a finding which further weakens the notion of any overarching 
tendency among parties. Table 14 reports the assembly-based and plebiscitary IPD indices, by 
country. Let us first focus on the assembly-based intra-party democracy. There is some spread 
within countries – and this is to be expected – but in 11 of the 129 countries the difference 
between the highest and lowest AIPD score is less than 34 points , and in some countries, it is 
considerably less ( e.g. Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Norway, Portugal, and Spain ).  
There are greater differences of the general levels of AIPD between countries. Austria, France, 
Poland, Portugal and Spain stand out for having relatively low AIPD values, while Germany, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway and Britain are characterized by generally high levels of 
AIPD.  
 
Table 14 ABOUT HERE 
 
The picture changes entirely when we focus on the plebiscitary variant of IPD. Here we see two 
patterns. There is considerably more spread within countries: in some countries, there is 
complete uniformity because of the absence of plebisicitary practices (Austria, Czech Republic, 
Poland), in 14 countries one or more parties have not introduced any plebiscitary measures, 
while a few of the other countries stand out because most or all parties register fairly high PIPD 
values (Belgium, Canada, Italy, Britain). In the latter three countries, it seems reasonable to 
speculate that we are seeing the effect of institutional diffusion. In the remaining countries, 
parties vary widely in the extent to which they have adopted plebiscitary mechanisms. If 
diffusion pressures are strong, we would expect that coming years will bring an upward 
convergence on the PIPD indices, at least in countries where at least one party has already 
adopted such measures. Finally, when looking at the eta-squared values in tables 13 and 14 we 
see again a much stronger effect by country than by ideological family. 
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VII. Connecting resources, structures and linkages 
After presenting this descriptive overview of the main findings of the PPDB Round 1 data, it is 
time to begin examining how our three analytical dimensions relate to one another empirically. 
This is not the place to investigate and test causal hypotheses, but we can at least provide the 
grounds for developing such hypotheses by exploring some basic statistical relationships within 
the data. We do this here by reporting the partial bivariate correlation coefficients for a number 
of indicators that are drawn from across the three dimensions. The key indicators include AIPD 
as a measure of democratic linkage, leadership strength as a measure of organizational structure, 
and three measures of party resources: membership/electorate ratio, party income/GDP ratio, and  
percentage of party income that comes from state subsidies. These resource measures are as 
ratios that control for potential country effects; in addition, we deploy party family as a general 
control variable for all reported correlations.15 Thus, party family and country effects are held 
constant. 
 
The results reveal a number of interesting relationships across the three dimensions of analysis. 
First, in terms of association between AIPD and the other dimensions, we find that the less 
internally democratic parties are, the more members they have relative to electors, the richer and 
the more dependent on state funding they are, and the stronger their leaders are. Each of these 
relationships except that between ME ratio and AIPD is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
significance level or better. Second, there are also politically noteworthy associations between 
organizational structure and resources, in that the stronger leaders are within their parties, the 
more members they have, and the richer and the more dependent on state funding they tend to 
be; again, only the last two are statistically significant relationships. The relevant details are 
reported in Table 15. 
 
[Table 15 about here] 
 
  
These correlations point to areas for further investigation. For instance, they suggest different 
categories of parties that might exist. The first is a group of parties that are (in national terms) 
large, rich and heavily dependent on state subsidies; these will also tend to be relatively ‘top-
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down’, leader-dominated organizations. By contrast, the second group is the opposite of all these 
things: it consists of parties that are (in the own national contexts) relatively small, poor, and not 
so well supported by the state, but which are more internally democratic and less leadership-
dominated. Whether we can actually distinguish such clusters of parties is a task for future 
research.  
 
Our preliminary findings also invite researchers to address some of the major ‘so what?’ 
questions of this field of political science: For instance, what are the consequences of these 
organizational patterns for the legitimacy of party and political systems? If a country has a 
preponderance of large, leader-dominated and state-dependent parties, does this lead to higher 
levels of public dissatisfaction with the parties and/or political systems as a whole? And what of 
the consequences for public policy? Are such countries more or less likely to generate policy 
outcomes that represent the views of a majority of electors?  Here, we can only raise such 
questions rather than attempt to answer them.  However, we suggest that the PPDB data and 
measures not only point the way for politically important lines of future research, but also 
provide some tools that should help researchers who want to tackle these research puzzles.    
 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
Our analyses of the PPDB data have demonstrated a remarkable coexistence of uniformity and 
diversity. When it comes to some of the main indicators of party organizational capacity such as 
party members, staff and finance, all evidence points in the direction of continuing trends that 
have been diagnosed for many years. Comparisons with previous studies clearly show that in 
most cases party membership has continued to decline, while financial resources and paid labour 
have continued to grow. Yet, substantial differences persist between party families and, more 
importantly, between countries.  
On the other hand, we find truly remarkable uniformity regarding the core architecture of 
party organizations. Despite the enormous attention some groups of new parties have attracted in 
the media and in scholarly literature, the evidence is clear: if they survive, they adapt their 
organizational skeleton to a common template.  Virtually all have regular party conferences 
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which function as supreme ‘law making’ intra-party bodies; they normally have one (some two) 
party leaders with clearly defined powers, and they tend to have a supreme executive body.  This 
convergence occurs even where laws do not require it, suggesting that in these countries this 
organizational style has become a normative imperative or a functional necessity – or both. 
This image of overwhelming uniformity changes again when we combine a large number 
of detailed rules on the functioning of these seemingly similar organisations into indices for two 
variants of intra-party democracy, namely IPD based on meetings and discussions and IPD based 
on ballots outside the context of assemblies. Here, we find substantial variation between 
countries and party families. While assembly-based IPD is the standard model of intra-party 
decision-making, at greater or lesser degrees of inclusiveness, the provisions for plebiscitary IPD 
vary substantially. They are simply non-existent in a considerable number of parties, and in some 
countries altogether.  Overall, we see rather wide variation in how parties combine these 
different types of practices, and in the extent to which they have expanded the locus of decision-
making.  
In sum, one clear message from this preliminary examination of the first round PPDB 
data is that there is still a lot of mileage in closer examination of the details of party organization. 
Uniformity, which is all too often in the limelight, is clearly only part of the story. While 
scholars have a tendency to look for organizational trends, individual parties often seek to gain 
electoral advantage through organizational innovation.  Thus, while party organizations across 
modern democracies have much in common now, there is more diversity, particularly between 
countries, than many classics of the party literature imply.  If parties and their popular 
organizations can play crucial roles in integrating citizens and their political demands into the 
political process, as much literature on representative democracy asserts, then these 
organizational differences deserve continued scrutiny, because they can have important political 
consequences.  
 
 
  
28 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1   
Project Supporters 
This project has been supported by funding from the following institutions and associations, 
listed in alphabetical order.  We are grateful for their support, which was essential to the success 
of this multi-national collaboration.  
 
Main grant: 
Open Research Area Project (ORA) funded by: 
Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft (Germany) PO 370/11-1 
Economic and Social Research Council  (UK) ES/L016613/1  
National Science Foundation (USA) 106498 
 
Additional support provided by: 
Düsseldorf Party Research Institute (PRuF), Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf (Germany)  
European Consortium for Political Research  (Research Sessions 2011) 
Fritz-Thyssen-Foundation (Germany) 
Israel Studies Collaborative (ISC) at the Schusterman Center for Jewish Studies, University of 
Texas at Austin (USA) 
Levi Eshkol Institute for Social, Economic and Political Research (Israel) 
University of Houston Small Grants Fund (USA) 
University of Oslo Småforsk  (Norway) 
University of Leiden (Netherlands) 
University of Sydney – International Program Development Fund (Australia) 
 
29 
 
Appendix 2 
PPDB Round 1 Country Teams 
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Appendix 3 
Parties included in PPDB Round 1 
 
Australia Denmark 
Labor Party Conservatives 
Liberal Party Danish People's Party 
National Party Liberal Alliance 
The Greens Liberals 
Austria Red-Green Alliance 
Alliance for the Future Social Democrats 
Freedom Party Social Liberal Party 
People's Party Socialist People's Party 
Social Democratic Party France 
The Greens Socialist Party 
Belgium Union for a Popular Movement 
Christian-Democrat and Flemish Germany 
Democrat Humanist Centre Alliance '90/The Greens 
Ecolo Christian Democratic Union 
Federalists, Democrats, Francophone Christian Social Union 
Flemish Interest Free Democratic Party 
Green Pirate Party 
Libertarian, Direct, Democratic Social Democratic Party 
New Flemish Alliance The Left 
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats Hungary 
Reform Movement Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Alliance 
Socialist Party Jobbik 
Socialist Party Alternative Politics Can Be Different 
Canada Socialist Party 
Bloc Québeçois Ireland 
Conservative Party Fianna Fáil 
Green Party Fine Gael 
Liberal Party Green Party 
New Democratic Party Labour Party 
Czech Republic Sinn Fein 
Christian Democratic Union  
Civic Democratic Party  
Communist Party  
Social Democratic Party  
TOP 09  
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Israel Poland 
Agudat Yisrael Civic Platform 
Balad Democratic Left Alliance 
Hadash Law and Justice 
Kadima Palikot's Movement 
Labor Party Polish People's Party 
Likud United Poland 
Meretz Portugal 
National Religious Party Communist Party 
Shas Ecologist Party "The Greens" 
Yisrael Beiteinu Left Bloc 
Italy People's Party 
Democratic Party Social Democratic Party 
Italy of Values Socialist Party 
Northern League Spain 
The People of Freedom Basque Nationalist Party 
Union of the Centre Democratic Convergence of Catalonia 
Netherlands People's Party 
50PLUS Socialist Party 
Christian Democratic Appeal United Left 
Christian Union Sweden 
Democrats 66 Centre Party 
Green Left Christian Democrats 
Labour Party Green Party 
Party for Freedom Left Party 
Party for the Animals Liberal People's Party 
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy Moderate Party 
Reformed Political Party Social Democrats 
Socialist Party Sweden Democrats 
Norway United Kingdom 
Centre Party Conservative Party 
Christian Democratic Party Green Party 
Conservative Party Labour Party 
Labour Party Liberal Democrats 
Liberal Party Plaid Cymru 
Progress Party Scottish National Party 
Socialist Left Party UK Independence Party 
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Appendix: The Intra-Party Democracy Indices 
The applied logic of quantification is largely based on von dem Berge et al. (2013: 31ff.). There 
are two different modes of assigning IPD-values to PPDB-items: (1) Closed or open answers to 
questions (PPDB-items) are attributed the values 0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 or 1.00. All answers 
which affect IPD adversely are attributed the values 0.00 or 0.25, and answers which affect IPD 
favourably are attributed the values 0.75 or 1.00. The value 0.50 is allocated to an answer when 
no specific effects on IPD can be identified. (2) Furthermore, some variables are generated on 
the basis of ‘rankings’ of individual PPDB-items. Table A1 illustrates how these theoretically-
grounded codings are applied to party statutes.  
  
Table A1: Example of ‘ranking’ of party levels 
PPDB-Question: Who has the final vote on the manifesto? 
PPDB-answer-option DIPD-Value Effect on DIPD 
Party Congress 1.00 (max IPD; most ‘inclusive‘) Pro IPD Party Sub-Units 0.75 
Party Legislators 0.50 Not explicitly pro/contra IPD 
Executive Commitee 0.25 Contra IPD Party Leader 0.00 (min IPD; least ‘inclusive‘) 
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Table A2: Composition of Discursive IPD-Index 
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Who has the final vote on the 
manifesto?   
(1a) Are rules for the 
selection of the party 
leader existent?  
ARITMETHIC  
MEAN  
of all “party leader 
variables” 
Who is eligible to vote at the party 
congress? 
 (1b) Who has the final 
vote in the party leader 
selection process?  1 
How frequently must a party congress be 
held? 
 (1c) Was there a vote at 
the most inclusive stage of 
the party leader selection 
process? 
Who has ex officio seats with full voting 
rights in the party’s highest executive 
body? 
 (1d) Who was eligible to 
participate in this vote 
(referring to previous 
question)? 
Prerogatives and accountability of the 
party leader? 
 (2) Who has the final vote in the candidate selection 
process?   
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of the components “DM: programme”, “DM: personnel” and “organizational structure” 
 
Table A3: Composition of Plebiscitary IPD-Index  
IPD-Component IPD-Variables  (PPDB-items) 
Decision-Making:  
Programme and issues 
Do all party members have a vote on the manifesto?  
Are there intra-party policy ballots in which all party 
members decide on policy issues? 
Decision-Making:  
Personnel 
Do all party members have a vote in the party leader 
selection process? 
Do all party members have the final vote in the candidate 
selection process? 
Organizational Structure --- no items/variables --- 
IPD-PD-Scale Score ARITMETHIC MEAN of all variables 
 
                                                 
1  1b and d partially overlap. We have decided to keep both variables to improve precision. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1  We are grateful to all funders, especially our national funding bodies (the NSF, the ESRC and the DFG), 
and our universities who have supported primary research, travel and meetings for all project members. A full listing 
of funders to date is included in Appendix 1.   
2  Those using PPDB Round 1 data should reference this article for a full introduction to the data set and to 
those who contributed to it.  
3  We consciously violated this rule in a few  places, for instance when we ask team members to not only give 
the official rules for candidate selection, but to also give an expert opinion about which levels of the party had the 
most influence in the most recent round of candidate selections.  In these places, those who distrust the judgment of 
a single expert can ignore these variables and rely solely on the official stories. 
4  This is not to overlook the obvious fact that party members might also be considered a form of linkage 
between parties and society, but here they will be examined from the perspective of organizational resources. 
5  In addition, our results may be distorted somewhat that it includes data on election years for 7 of our 19 
countries.  
6  The parties have been categorized on the basis of their membership in supranational party bodies and expert 
judgments. Details can be obtained from the authors. 
7  Unfortunately, there are rather fewer cases for which we have both central and legislative party staffing 
data - only approximately one-third of the total number of parties, which we feel is too few from which to gain a 
clear picture, so we do not report those figures here. 
8   The extraordinary number of staff employed by parliamentary parties in Germany owes something to the 
difficulty of attracting state funding beyond a fixed ‘absolute ceiling’ which limits the overall sum of money that can 
go from the state to political parties. This ceiling did not change for many years until the Bundestag introduced 
indexation in 2013. The way around this for the parties was to increase the number of their parliamentary staff, all of 
whom are paid for by the state. According to German legal doctrine, their work pertains to the sphere of the state 
rather than the parties, since formally the parliamentary parties are not supposed to do things that directly benefit the 
extra-parliamentary party. The reality, however, is that these personnel split their time between working for MPs as 
personal assistants and working for the parliamentary (and sometimes extra-parliamentary) parties. In this way they 
clearly constitute a resource of the party, then; however, it does render the German situation somewhat unique, so 
readers may prefer to exclude the German figures when reflecting on the overall averages for parliamentary party 
staff. 
9  Perhaps unexpectedly, there are no large differences between party families in terms of the leader’s 
accountability to the party conference. Green parties were slightly more likely to specify this, but all party families 
were in the range from 25-37 percent. 
10  See von dem Berge and Poguntke 2016 for details of index construction. 
11  Our indices include only rights for full members, and do not take account of whether similar rights are 
offered to registered supporters or other kinds of party affiliates.  Thus, the indices do not rate parties more highly if 
they open participation to non-members. Our theoretical justification is that including open procedures strains the 
theoretical notion of “intra” party democracy, which is our primary interest here. Within the current PPDB universe, 
these situations are empirically rare, though some have been high profile cases, such as the UK Labour Party 
election in 2015 which allowed participation by ‘registered supporters’ who were not full members. 
12  The indices used in this section are based on von dem Berge and Poguntke 2016.  Other members of the 
PPDB team have constructed different indices of IPD for other articles.  We do not suggest that this coding scheme 
is the only way to analyse differences in intra-party governance, but we think it is plausible one.  Different coding 
schemes would affect the details of relationships reported in the following sections, but probably would not change 
their major conclusions. 
13  See Appendix and von dem Berge and Poguntke 2016 for details on how the indices were constructed. 
14  The situation is different for the plebiscitary index which includes only two components. Here we have 
simply used all available data.  
15  Note that this is a modified variant of our standard party family variable that takes into account the mean 
position of each family in left-right terms, using CMP data. In effect, this converts a categorical variable into an 
interval-level scale. The mean scores for each party family, running from left to right, are as follows: Left socialist (-
29.2), Green (-20.3), social democrat (-13.2), Liberal (6.2), Christian Democrat/Conservative (10.9), far right (11.9). 
N=68 for all of the partial bivariate correlations reported here. 
35 
 
 
